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FUTURE TECHNOLOGY AND ETHICS IN WAR 
 
James Jay Carafano* 
 
The influence of technology on war is overrated. Technology does not win 
wars. It does not lose wars. It does not even fight wars. People do. New technology 
is the handmaiden of change, but even technologies that take the human “out of the 
loop” have a hand behind the handmaiden. New technologies pose far fewer new 
ethical challenges to warfare than is often supposed. The current wave of 
technological innovation, which is largely derivative of innovations in data 
processing and transmission, will not change the traditional relationship between 
technology and ethics in war very much. 
On the other hand, there are enormous challenges to the traditional ethical 
framework that has been used to judge the use of violence in armed conflict. This 
tug-of-war is at the root of the contemporary debate over the changing role of 
weapons in war. 
 
I.  JUST WAR AND CURRENT WAR 
 
Foundational to this assessment is the belief that ethics are rooted in culture. 
In the West, the predominant ethical framework for assessing what is right and 
wrong is the just war doctrine (also described as just war theory or the just war 
tradition).1 This doctrine, deriving from classical and Christian philosophy, is at 
the root of the Western conception of what constitutes the legitimate use of force 
by the state.2 
In applying the ethics of war to technology, the most relevant principle of just 
war doctrine is the standard of proportionality. “Just war theory, the most widely 
accepted theory of the morality of war,” Professor Thomas Hurka rightly points 
out, “contains two proportionality conditions that say a war or an act in war is 
justified only if the damage it causes is not excessive.”3 One set of conditions are 
the jus ad bellum.4 Before force is used, it must be for a reasonable purpose, 
employed by a competent authority, and have a reasonable chance of success.5 In 
addition, the destructive evil caused by war must not be disproportionate to the 
relevant good a just war might accomplish.6 The other set of conditions are the jus 
* © 2013 James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Vice President, Foreign and Defense Policy 
Studies, E.W. Richardson Fellow, and Director. 
1 See JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR, 
at xxi (1981). 
2 See, e.g., id. at xxiv. 
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in bello.7 Intentionally targeting noncombatants is forbidden, and combatants must 
make efforts to limit the danger to noncombatants.8 The use of force must be for a 
military purpose—in other words not indiscriminate—and the risk to harming 
innocents cannot be out of proportion to the direct military end that is anticipated.9 
For example, leveling an entire city to take out a sniper would be considered a 
violation of the proportionality principle. Indeed, such prohibitions are codified in 
formal rules, such as the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention.10 
Introducing new technologies does not change anything in using the ethical 
framework of the just war doctrine. As the technology changes and evolves, what 
is proportional is largely a military-technical question, not an ethical one. As 
technology gets more destructive, or its application more precise, what could be 
considered legitimately proportional might change—but that is a question of 
prudent judgment, not morality. 
 
II.  THE TECHNOLOGICAL CONSTANT 
 
It is a mistake to believe the ethical application of technology in war can be 
determined in absence of a practical understanding of how the technology is 
applied. A case in point was the development of strategic bombing during World 
War II, which saw a significant increase in the destructive power of aerial 
bombing—way out of proportion to the capacity of militaries to more precisely 
direct that power to limit the danger to innocents. Disconnecting that reality from 
ethical judgment skews the results. Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars: A 
Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, however, makes exactly that 
mistake.11 Rather than derive theory from history, as his subtitle suggests, Walzer 
uses historical examples to illustrate a theory of ethical decision making—and he 
gets it exactly wrong.12 He has little confidence in the study of facts. Instead, the 
practice of warfare is considered subjective and vague—primarily a tool for 
illustrating the complexities of choice rather than a guide for action. 
To illustrate the moral challenges of command responsibility, Walzer draws 
on General Omar Bradley’s decision to carpet bomb the area west of St. Lo during 
the Allied breakout from Normandy in July 1944.13 During the bombing, Allied 
7 Id. at 36. 
8 Hurka, supra note 3, at 36. 
9 Id. 
10 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 51(5)(b), 
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
11 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH 
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (4th ed., 2006). 
12 Id. A portion of this Article was derived from James Jay Carafano, The Ethics of 
Operation Cobra and the Normandy Breakout (January 2000) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://isme.tamu.edu/JSCOPE00/Carafano00.html, which was presented to the 
Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics. 
13 WALZER, supra note 11, at 317–19. 
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planes killed and wounded an unknown number of French civilians, as well as 
hundreds of American soldiers.14 Walzer suggests that if Bradley had not taken 
“due care” to make the minimum reasonable effort to minimize civilian casualties 
or consider reasonable alternatives, his decision to bomb civilians was morally 
indefensible.15 But then Walzer admits he lacks the technical expertise and 
research to fairly judge the General’s choice and simply concludes, “There is no 
sure rule against which to measure the conduct of General Bradley.”16 Walzer 
misses an opportunity to make an important point: in modern warfare, technical 
knowledge and expertise are central to the issue of determining command 
responsibility. 
The reality was that as brutal as carpet bombing might have appeared from 
Walzer’s perspective—an academic writing in the late 1970s—he did not know 
what he was talking about. In his book, Walzer offers several alternative courses of 
action that Bradley might have used to avoid the carpet bombing.17 In reality, a 
careful study shows that none were really practical alternatives and that Bradley’s 
tactical scheme was not only appropriate, but the best option available.18 In short, 
Walzer turns a technical judgment into a moral question because he does not know 
what he is talking about. 
Technology in war has come a very long way since World War II. As Charles 
Williams Maynes pointed out over two decades ago, since World War II we have 
not become more moral, but we have become more accurate.19 The spot that 
required nine thousand bombs to hit accurately in World War II required two 
hundred in Vietnam and one in the Gulf War.20 Today, the US military can take out 
a target with a single bomb or missile.21 Yet technical issues such as accuracy and 
lethality are as essential to the calculus of determining moral responsibility today 
as they were then. For a discussion of ethical conduct to contribute to 
understanding, the considerations of theory and practice must go hand in hand. 
Practice is not simply a tool for illuminating theory. 
Often discussions of the ethics of modern war—such as the use of armed 
drones—are not about ethics at all, but are rather a technical-military assessment of 
the appropriate use of force. 
14 Id. at 318–19. 
15 Id. at 319. 
16 Id. at 321. 
17 Id. at 318 (“Perhaps civilians all along the battlefront could have been warned[,] the 
attack could have been redirected[, or] the planes, flying low, could have aimed at specific 
enemy targets . . . .”). 
18 See JAMES JAY CARAFANO, AFTER D-DAY: OPERATION COBRA AND THE 
NORMANDY BREAKOUT (2008). 
19 See Charles William Maynes, “Principled” Hegemony, WORLD POL’Y J., Fall 
1997, at 31, 34. 
20 Id. 
21 See id.; see also RAYTHEON, TOMAHAWK: SERVING THE U.S. AND ALLIED 
WARFIGHTER 1–2 (2012) (detailing recent technical updates and achievements). 
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Granted, these debates can be maddening. Critics complain that covert 
operations are, well, covert, and the facts to judge the judgments are not readily 
available.22 Even where there are not concerns for operational security, the basic 
facts and information needed to evaluate military decisionmaking may not be 
readily available—lost in the fog of war. Some groups create their own facts. 
Efforts to estimate civilian deaths due to the Iraq War offer a case in point.23 Lack 
of basic effort may make evaluations of military decisions difficult for outsiders, 
but that is not a new problem, and it does not create a new ethical dilemma. 
 
III.  THE CHALLENGE OF NEW ETHICS 
 
How we think about technology in war may indeed be changing, but not 
necessarily because the technology is changing. Our thinking may be changing 
because our ethics are changing. One particularly important trend to note is the rise 
of the importance of empathy in Western culture.24 We may be entering an age 
where feeling may increasingly trump reason when judging the use of violence. 
The Western thinking and the ethics at the foundation of that way of thinking 
are rooted in two competing intellectual cultures. On the one hand, the Western 
approach to war derives from a tradition of applying rational decisions to public 
decisions.25 On the other hand, we are also products of an older narrative culture, 
dominated by the oral transmission of ideas in the form of stories that have a 
beginning and an end, heroes and villains, and lessons to be learned.26 
The information age has empowered both our rational and narrative cultures. 
Information technology gives us more data, but it also allows opinion-makers to 
spin better, more compelling stories faster and to proliferate them more widely.27 
In many areas of modern life the analytical power of the information age 
dominates, but not in the public sphere where public policies are disputed, 
including our judgments over what is just in war.28 While computers expand 
computational power, they also power e-mail, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and 
22 Charles R. Beitz, Covert Intervention as a Moral Problem, 3 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 
45, 57–60 (1989). 
23 Hannah Fischer, Iraqi Civilian Deaths Estimates, in ECONOMICS AND GEOPOLITICS 
IN THE MIDDLE EAST 87 (Richard N. Dralonge ed., 2008). 
24 See LYNN HUNT, INVENTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A HISTORY 35–69 (2007) (discussing 
how “new kinds of experiences, from viewing pictures in public exhibitions to reading the 
hugely popular epistolary novels about love and marriage . . . [have] helped spread the 
practices of autonomy and empathy”). 
25 James Jay Carafano, Thinking the Future, WHITEHEAD J. DIPL. & INT’L REL., 
Summer/Fall 2009, at 27. 
26 Id. at 30–31. 
27ALEX WRIGHT, GLUT: MASTERING INFORMATION THROUGH THE AGES 231–32 
(2007). 
28 See Carafano, supra note 25, at 29. 
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other social networking tools (often collectively called Web 2.0),29 which facilitate 
conversation and storytelling on a global scale.30 
Narrative culture’s emerging dominance may also be attributable in part to the 
increasing importance of empathy in the contemporary world. Empathy has risen 
to become a key preferred attribute of Western society.31 The emotion of caring 
overwhelms the logic of cold hard facts. Because stories are particularly effective 
at stirring our empathic impulses, the power of information technology pushes that 
impulse into overdrive.32 Historian Lynn Hunt argues, for example, that 
contemporary concerns over torture and the universal nature of human rights are 
modern expressions of an increasingly empathic culture.33 
Another possible candidate for explaining the rising power of the narrative 
over analysis is the profound transformation in our understandings of the 
representation of truth and facts that has been driven by postmodern philosophy 
and literary criticism. “These have led scholars to value ‘smart’ and ‘interesting’ 
work over the ‘sound’ and ‘rigorous’ studies that were most praised in earlier 
decades,” suggests sociologist Michéle Lamont.34 Perhaps these academic attitudes 
have crossed over to influence the character of the debate in public decisionmaking 
as well. The emphasis on empathy and feeling over rational judgment makes 
ethical judgments such as proportionality seem quaint, old fashioned, and out of 
touch with modern sentiments. 
A second challenge to the just war tradition is the increasing use of “lawfare” 
in international politics.35 This tactic comprises efforts to thwart U.S. policies by 
attempting to undermine America’s legitimate efforts to exercise sovereignty and 
act in its own interests as it sees fit.36 Some analysts define this lawfare as 
misusing or reinterpreting laws to make American actions appear illegitimate in 
the eyes of the world.37 
29 See George Ritzer & Nathan Jurgenson, Production, Consumption, Prosumption: 
The Nature of Capitalism in the Age of the Digital ‘Prosumer,’ 10 J. CONSUMER CULTURE 
13, 14 (2010) (recognizing Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter as Web 2.0). 
30 Carafano, supra note 25, at 31 (citing Josef Kolbitsch & Hermann Maurer, The 
Transformation of the Web: How Emerging Communities Shape the Information We 
Consume, 12 J. UNIVERSAL COMPUTER SCI. 187 (2006)). 
31 Id. (citing HUNT, supra note 24, at 28–29, 39–40). 
32 Id.; see also P.J. Manney, Empathy in the Time of Technology: How Storytelling Is 
the Key to Technology, J. EVOLUTION & TECH., Sept. 2008, at 51 (2008), http://jetpress.org/ 
v19/manney.pdf. 
33 HUNT, supra note 24, at 28–31. 
34 MICHÈLE LAMONT, HOW PROFESSORS THINK: INSIDE THE CURIOUS WORLD OF 
ACADEMIC JUDGMENT 73 (2009). 
35 See Orde F. Kittrie, Lawfare and U.S. National Security, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L 
L. 393, 394 (2010). 
36 See id. at 395–99 (describing forms of lawfare used against the United States). 
37 See Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr., International Law and the Nation-State 
at the U.N.: A Guide for U.S. Policymakers, BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Found., 
Washington, D.C.), Aug. 18, 2006, at 20, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/ 
                                                 
1268 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
 
One particularly egregious exercise of lawfare has been conducted by 
international human rights activists, including certain “special rapporteurs” 
operating out of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva.38 Attacks 
with U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles (commonly referred to as drones) have been 
one particular target for these groups.39 Indeed, U.N. special rapporteur Ben 
Emmerson of the United Kingdom recently announced a new investigation into the 
U.S.’s use of drones in various countries.40 
The problem with lawfare is that it blurs the line between the law and political 
advocacy. What is rational or legitimate becomes less important than what we 
want. Such a basis of public decisionmaking is far different from the rules of war 
derived from the just war tradition. 
A third challenge to the just war framework is the increasing argument in 
international affairs that sovereignty just does not count anymore. Just war 
traditions are grounded in the belief that the State is the ultimate arbiter of the use 
of force in the name of the State.41 That idea is increasingly coming under 
question. Human security, for example, is a concept that is being increasingly 
trumpeted as a collection of rights that trump the sovereign authority of the State 
when it comes to the legitimate use of force. 
Over the years, various groups have stretched the definition of “security” to 
mean supranational entities intervening ostensibly to protect individuals anywhere 
and the definition of “rights” to include everything from a right to life to a right to 
development and resources.42 For example, the United Nations is pursuing a broad 
reports/2006/08/international-law-and-the-nation-state-at-the-un-a-guide-for-us-policymak
ers. 
38 See News Release, Office of the High Comm’r of Human Rights, Statement by Ben 
Emmerson, UN Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights Concerning 
the Launch of an Inquiry into the Civilian Impact, and Human Rights Implications of the 
use Drones and Other Forms of Targeted Killing for the Purpose of Counter-Terrorism and 
Counter-Insurgency (Jan. 24, 2013), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ 
Terrorism/SRCTBenEmmersonQC.24January12.pdf; UN Counter-Terrorism Expert to 
Launch Inquiry into the Civilian Impact of Drones and Other Forms of Targeted Killing, 
OFFICE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/ 
EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12943&LangID=E. 
39 See News Release, Office of the High Comm’r of Human Rights, supra note 38, at 
2–3. 
40 See id.; UN Counter-Terrorism Expert to Launch Inquiry into the Civilian Impact 
of Drones and Other Forms of Targeted Killing, supra note 38. 
41 See, e.g., JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, ETHICS AND THE USE OF FORCE: JUST WAR IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 90 (2011); Alexander Moseley, Just War Theory, INTERNET 
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHILOSOPHY, http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwar/#H2 (last updated Feb. 10, 
2009). 
42 James Jay Carafano & Janice A. Smith, The Muddled Notion of ‘Human Security’ 
at the U.N.: A Guide for U.S. Policymakers, BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Found., 
Washington, D.C.), Sept. 1, 2006, at 1–2, available at http://www.heritage.org/research/ 
reports/2006/09/the-muddled-notion-of-human-security-at-the-un-a-guide-for-us-policyma
kers. 
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human security agenda that aims to shift the focus of U.N. and other international 
activities away from state relations to protecting groups of people based on a 
plethora of needs and wants.43 If the responsibility for determining the legitimate 
use of force shifts from States to international organizations, then the rules may 
change as well. 
A fourth challenge to the just war approach is that wars are increasingly 
occurring among cultures that do not share the same ethical framework. As James 
Bowman points out, the concept of “honor” is interpreted differently in different 
parts of the world.44 In the West, the notion of honor became equivalent to virtue. 
Other cultures equate honor with power. So what is honorable in war may be very 
different to warriors reared in different traditions. 
 
IV.  BRAVE NEW WORLD 
 
The modern debate about the ethics of technology in war is not about changes 
in technology. It is about tensions that are pulling the ethical frameworks we use to 
evaluate what is just in war in different directions. For example, social science 
research shows that when intelligence analysts look at the same data using 
different conceptual structures, they often reach different conclusions on how to 
interpret the “facts.”45 That same dynamic is affecting the increasingly contentious 
debate on how to view the legitimate use of technology in modern war. 
43 Id. at 2. 
44 See generally JAMES BOWMAN, HONOR: A HISTORY (2006) (comparing the notion 
of “honor” between cultures and across time periods). 
45 See Ytzhak Katz & Ygal Vardi, Strategies for Data Gathering and Evaluation in 
the Intelligence Community, 5 INT’L J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 313, 325–
27 (1991). 
                                                 
